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Government subsidization of public higher education primarily is a function of 
the states.  Even today, with budgets in crisis, the states provide over four dollars of 
support for higher education expenses for every dollar of federal subsidy.  Yet public 
effort in support of higher education – measured as state funding per $1000 of personal 
income – has been in decline for the last quarter century.   The magnitude of this decline 
has been quite significant.  Aggregate state effort has fallen by thirty percent since the 
late 1970s.   
In this paper we evaluate the connection between state higher education effort and 
the tax revolt that began in the 1970s.  The tax revolt gave birth to a set of laws and 
constitutional provisions that have dramatically changed taxing and spending policies in 
many states.  The tax revolt is based on the notion that government is too large, and that 
the appropriate strategy is to “starve the beast.”  The most prominent legal change 
resulting from the tax revolt is the Tax and Expenditure Limitation (TEL), which limits 
the growth of state revenue or expenditures to some outside indicator, most commonly 
the growth of state personal income.  Starting in the late 1970’s twenty-three states 
adopted a TEL.  Also, though this happened more slowly and less often, states added 
super majority requirements (SMRs), typically two-thirds, for the legislature to approve 
tax increases.  Thirteen states have an SMR.  
We use a forty-one year panel of state data from 1961 to 2001 to investigate the 
importance of these tax revolt institutions for state effort on higher education.   Both 
TELs and SMRs prove to be very robust predictors of the time series and cross sectional   2 
variation in state funding effort. Together with rising costs, this retreat of public effort is 
a major component of the financial difficulties faced by state-supported colleges and 
universities.  One measure of the consequences of this financial crisis at public 
institutions is the ratio of spending per full time student at public institutions relative to 
private institutions.  In 1980 public institutions spent seventy cents for every dollar spent 
at private colleges and universities.  By the late 1990s that figure had fallen to fifty-five 
cents.
1 Understanding the causes of this retreat is crucial if there is any chance of 
reversing it.  Changing the political climate is never easy, but our results suggest that the 
task ahead is even more difficult.  All of the SMRs and a majority of the TELs are 
amendments to state constitutions.  They are firmly in place. 
The questions that motivate our paper arise at three distinct levels of generality.  
At the highest level, the issue is whether or not institutions actually affect policy 
outcomes.  At the next, more specific level, the question is whether or not the particular 
institutions spawned by the tax revolt affect policy.   There is an extensive literature, both 
theoretical and empirical, on these two questions.  Our contribution comes from 
extending the discussion to the third and most specific question; have the tax revolt 
institutions had a meaningful effect on higher education effort in particular.  In this 
introduction we briefly review the literature on the highest level question.   We discuss 
the more specific implications of the tax revolt institutions in separate sections of the 
paper. 
That political institutions should matter for policy outcomes is not self-evident.  
In much of the political economy literature as it has evolved since Anthony Downs 
(1957), policy outcomes are driven by the preferences of the median voter.  This is true if 
                                                 
1 See Thomas Kane, Peter Orszag and David Gunter (2003).   3 
politicians know voter preferences and can align their proposals accordingly.  In this case 
there is little scope for the institutional structure of decision making to exert an 
independent effect on policy outcomes.  Institutions become important again whenever 
any of the assumptions of the Downsian paradigm are removed.   
In particular, political parties may care about policy as well as winning elections.  
They may have imperfect information about voter preferences, and those preferences may 
not be single peaked.
2  They may be dependent on political contributions that come from 
the extremes within a polarized electorate.   An independent role for interest groups also 
calls into question the spatial choice nature of median voter models.
3  Lastly, in multi-
issue political settings, the theoretical work of Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast 
(1981) and Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal (1978) show the importance of 
restrictions on the power to propose policies within a legislative process.   These changes 
to the basic assumptions all may lead to departures from the median voter’s preferred 
outcome or to the reduced political salience of the median voter, creating a role for 
institutions to affect policy choices. 
Timothy Besley and Anne Case (2003) provide a thorough review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the role political institutions play in determining 
policy choices in the United States.  They consider electoral rules such as limitations on 
who can vote and whether or not proportional representation is used and decision making 
rules such as the line item veto,  rules for appointing regulators, and whether agencies are 
independent or not.  They conclude their detailed review of this literature by saying that 
the evidence from the US clearly indicates that institutions do matter.  Specifically, 
                                                 
2 See Alberto Alesina (1988).   
3 This is the basis for work by Matsusaka (1995) and Gilligan and Matsusaka ( 1995) on the role of the 
popular initiative and of logrolling as determinants of state spending.   4 
“There can be little doubt that the structure of political representation, the terms on which 
elections are fought, and the rules governing the policy process, all influence policy 
outcomes.” 
4 
  We address the remaining questions in six additional sections.  In section II we 
explain the institutions of particular interest to us, TELs and SMRs, and review the 
literature about their effects on state budgets.  In the third section we review the evidence 
of the slowdown in higher education spending and the literature on this slowdown.  In the 
fourth section, we describe the model and the data we use to test our hypothesis that the 
tax revolt institutions have an important impact on state spending effort for higher 
education. The fifth section presents our results.  We discuss the policy implications of 
our finding in section VI.   The final section contains conclusions. 
 
 II. Tax Revolt Institutions and Research on the Tax Revolt 
  
Tax Revolt Institutions – Individuals who did not trust legislatures started the 
tax revolt.  They were deeply concerned with the growth of government at all levels, but 
particularly with the growth of state government.  The basic strategy of the tax revolt is to 
put hard limitations on the growth of state tax revenues, or direct limits on spending 
growth.  Given balanced budget requirements the approaches are very similar.   
There are a number of theoretical reasons to expect that marginal voters might 
respond favorably to proposals that reduce the flow of resources toward public sector uses 
chosen by a legislature.
5  Agency problems in politics may be similar to those that 
characterize corporate governance.  If constituents have limited information about their 
                                                 
4 Besley and Case (2003), page 67. 
5 See John  Matsusaka (1995).   5 
representatives, legislators may shirk and implement policies contrary to constituent 
interests without being punished at the polls.  And logrolling within legislatures may help 
win approval for projects that are highly valued by some representatives even if they do not 
command a public majority.  This provides a rationale for why initiatives make their way 
onto the ballot – citizens distrust elected officials. 
Many of the TELs, however, were results of the legislative process itself.  There 
is ample support in the literature for why legislatures might act this way.
6   TELs and 
SMRs throw sand in the gears of government, thus constraining future legislatures that 
may have a different attitude toward the fiscal role of government.  Starting in 1976, 
twenty-three states enacted TELs.  Sixteen of the twenty-three TELs were enacted in the 
four-year period from 1977 to 1980.  A super majority requirement for a tax increase is 
motivated by the same fear of the growth of government.  If we make raising taxes more 
difficult, it will be harder for government to grow.  SMRs are much less prevalent than 
TELs, and in most cases they are a much more recent phenomenon.  Only thirteen states 
have such requirements, and six of these enacted their SMR in 1992 or thereafter. 
Table 1 gives a listing of the states that have TELs and some of the characteristics 
of the provisions.  These TELs are all limitations on total state spending or total state 
revenues as opposed to similar restrictions that affect particular taxes, typically property 
taxes.  The TELs are a hodgepodge of different types of regulations. Some are 
constitutional provisions, and others are statutory.  Some TELs restrict expenditures and 
others restrict taxation.   Most limitations are based on the growth of personal income in 
the state, but some states use population growth and inflation.  Also, the exact 
                                                 
6 Guido Tabellini and Albert Alesina (1990) show how strategic choices made by a current majority can 
constrain future majorities that may disagree with them using tools (like budget deficits) that may not be 
socially optimal.   6 
composition of the budget subject to the restriction varies across states.  In our empirical 
work below we will focus on three distinctions among TELS. 
The first of these distinctions was suggested by Besley and Case (2003), who 
distinguish between TELs that impose restrictive limits and ones that impose non-
restrictive limits.  Non-restrictive limits are ones that are either binding on the 
administration’s budget submissions, but not on the budget the legislature eventually 
passes, or that require only a simple majority of the legislature to override.  A priori one 
would expect restrictive TELs to have a greater effect on the decisions of budget makers 
than non-restrictive ones.  
Our second distinction concerns the breadth of the TEL.  Breadth is a difficult 
thing to measure, but it clearly varies across states.  For the purposes of our analysis, we 
determined whether or not college tuition, or expenditures funded by tuition, was affected 
by the TEL.  In cases in which tuition revenue is considered part of the budget that is 
limited by the TEL, the states generally had very broad-based limitations.  For example, 
Article IX, Section 17 of the Arizona constitution, which outlines the TEL, includes,
7 
  (2) For the purposes of this article, “state revenues”: 
 
(a) Include all monies, revenues, fees, fines, penalties, funds, tuitions, property 
and receipts on any kind whatsoever received by or for the accounts of the 
state or any of its agencies, departments, offices, boards, commissions, 
authorities, councils and institutions except as provided in this subsection.  
 
This describes a very broad-broad based TEL, much broader than in some states which 
explicitly exclude tuitions, fees, and other charges from the revenue subject to the limit.  
There are six states in our sample that include tuition, or expenditures funded by tuition, 
under their TEL. 
                                                 
7 Information on all of the tax revolt provisions including the languages in the statutes and constitutional 
amendments is available at www.limitedgovernment.org (accessed March 31, 2004).   7 
  The difference between a fixed-based TEL and a moving-based TEL is the final 
distinction of interest. A fixed-base TEL is one in which a state sets a limit and augments 
the limit each year.  Article XIII B of the California constitution provides an example of a 
fixed-base TEL, 
SPEC 1.  The total annual appropriations subject to limitation of the State and of 
each local government shall not exceed the appropriations limit of the entity of 
government for the prior year adjusted for the change in the cost of living and the 
change in population, except as otherwise provided in this article.  
 
We term this a fixed-base TEL because the limit is established on a base from the year in 
which the limitation started (1979) and the limit is augmented by a formula.  The 
important point is that the limit is not affected by last year’s spending. 
Article XXVIII of the Connecticut constitution provides an example of the 
alternative, a moving-based TEL: 
Sec. 18 b.  The general assembly shall not authorize an increase in general budget 
expenditures for any fiscal year above the amount of general budget expenditures 
authorized for the previous fiscal year by a percentage which exceeds the greater 
of the percentage increase in personal income or the percentage increase in 
inflation, …   
 
This is a moving-base TEL because in each year the base for the limit is the previous 
fiscal year’s expenditures.  The important distinction is between a limit on total spending 
– a fixed-base TEL - and a limit on each year’s additional spending – a moving-base 
TEL.   If the intent of the tax revolt was to limit the growth of state spending, the 
moving-base TEL should be more effective.  Our discussions with state budget officers in 
several states with fixed-based TELs suggested that the TEL, though present, did not 
constrain the budget process because a large gap had grown between the limit and actual 
state spending.  Such a gap is not possible with a moving-based TEL.  Eight states have   8 
fixed-based TELs; fourteen states have moving-based TELs, and one state, Utah, 
computes its TEL using a formula that is a mix of the two methods. 
  SMRs, on the other hand, are much more uniform, and all are parts of the state 
constitutions.  Table 2 lists the states with SMRs and gives the dates adopted and the 
percentage needed to increase taxes.  Some of the SMRs are provisions for temporary or 
emergency tax increases that later have to be approved by a vote of the citizenry, but 
most of them are explicit constraints on the state legislature.  Nine of the thirteen states 
that have an SMR also have a TEL, but it is only seldom the case that they were adopted 
in the same year.  Typically a state adopted its SMR after it had adopted a TEL.  
    Tax Revolt Research - The literature on the tax revolt focuses on whether or not 
it has achieved its main objective.  Therefore studies look at the effects of tax revolt 
limitations on aggregate state budgets.  Existing studies do not universally find a 
significant effect of TELs on aggregate state expenditures or aggregate state revenues.  It 
has been easier to find significant effects for SMRs.  The studies on TELs fall into two 
camps.  The first camp includes Burton Abrams and William Dougan (1986), Ronald 
Shadbegian (1996), and Dale Bails and Margie A. Tieslau (2000), who find that a TEL 
significantly decreases the size of state government, though Shadbegian’s result only 
holds when the TEL indicator variable is interacted with state income.  Studies in the 
other camp include Kim Rueben (1997), who finds no effect of a TEL using OLS or fixed 
effects models, and Brian Knight (2000) who finds that SMRs have a significant effect 
but that a TEL does not.  Besley and Case (2003) also conclude that TELs do not shrink 
state budgets, but that SMRs do have a significant effect.
8   
                                                 
8 Some of their results actually suggest perverse effects of TELs.   9 
  Much of the difficulty in this literature stems from the fact that the introduction of 
a tax or expenditure limit or a super majority rule is endogenous to the process of 
determining the size of state government budgets.  Typically these measures are 
introduced when a significant proportion of the state’s legislators, or the state’s voters in 
states that have the initiative process, become convinced that state spending or taxing is 
“out of control.”  Rueben (1997), and Knight (2000), deal with this problem by creating 
an instrument for the TEL or SMR.  The estimates using the instrument find effects for 
either TELs (Reuben) or SMRs (Knight) that are much larger and are more precisely 
measured than their other results suggest.  By focusing on a state’s spending within a 
subset of its budget we avoid the problem of whether or not a TEL or SMR is 
endogenous.  There exists no theory and/or evidence to suggest that increases in higher 
education spending alone were the trigger for the initiation of a TEL or an SMR.   
 
III. The Slowdown in State Appropriations for Higher Education 
 
  Students of higher education finance are indebted to the Grapevine project at 
Illinois State University for carefully collecting data on state appropriations for higher 
education.  Figure 1 displays these data for all states.
9  The data are for state higher 
education tax effort, measured as appropriations per $1,000 of state personal income.  
State tax effort measures the willingness of state taxpayers to pay taxes and appropriate 
the proceeds to run the state-supported colleges and universities.  The figure shows two 
distinct trends.  Citizens’ willingness to support higher education grew from 1961 to the 
late 1970s and decreased thereafter.    
Figure 1.  State Appropriations for Higher Education for $1000 
of Personal Income, Fiscal Years 1961 - 2004 
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The basic pattern described by Figure 1 is repeated in each state.  In every case 
the data exhibit a hump-shaped pattern.  Table 3 shows the years of peak effort for each 
state.  Effort in twenty-nine states peaked between 1974 and 1980, which is consistent 
with the peak in aggregate data in Figure 1.  There are, however, clearly some outliers.  
Effort peaked in South Dakota in 1969 and did not peak in Massachusetts, Ohio, 
Wyoming, and Iowa until 1988 or thereafter. 
Table 4 gives more detail on effort by state by displaying the data in rank order 
for 1961, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.  While picking patterns out of such a busy table is 
not easy, there are some noteworthy findings.  Some states seem to have very consistent 
patterns.  Massachusetts displays consistently low effort, ranking either first, second, or 
third in all five years.  Michigan is usually in the middle; its rank varies from sixteenth to 
twenty-ninth.  North Dakota is usually very high; it ranks above forty-five for every year 
but 1980 in which it is thirty-first.  There are also states that clearly moved around in the   11 
rankings.  Vermont started out above average at twenty-sixth in 1961 and improved to 
thirtieth in 1970, but its ranking fell precipitously thereafter, to eighth in 1980, third in 
1990, and second in 2000.  There is a similar story for Colorado.  It started well above 
average at thirty-fourth in 1961, but declined to the tenth ranked state in 2000.   New 
York, by contrast rode a roller coaster that ended roughly where it began, among the 
lowest effort states.  Yet in the middle year (1980), New York had risen to sixteenth.   
The fact that these state-level data share a basic pattern suggests that the declines 
in state appropriations have common causes.  On the other hand, the variation among 
states means there also must be influential state-specific factors.  In our analysis below, 
we attempt to determine the effect of both types of factors.   
  Previous Literature - There have been a great number of books and articles 
written about increases in college tuition.
10  There is also an extensive literature on the 
relationship between tuition at state-supported colleges and universities, state financial 
aid spending, and state appropriations.
11   But to the best of our knowledge there are no 
studies that try to measure the effects of tax revolt provisions on higher education 
spending. 
Don Hossler, Jon P. Lund, Jackie Ramin, Sarah Westfall, and Steve Irish (1997), 
provide a good example of a typical discussion of the fall in state appropriations for 
higher education.  They argue that the most significant trends affecting state 
appropriations include: 
“…competing demands for state-funds, declining federal commitment to student 
financial aid, sluggish state economies, declines in disposable family income, and 
increased demand for postsecondary education. (Page 161).” 
                                                 
10 Two excellent books on tuition are: Arthur M. Hauptman (1990) and Ronald G. Ehrenberg (2000). 
11 See, for example, Hearn, Griswold, and Marine (1996), Griswold and Marine (1996), and Robert C. 
Lowry (2001).    12 
 
Since the effort variable we use controls for state personal income, declines in disposable 
family income are not part of the explanation in our case.  Of the other issues, Hossler et 
al focus on the effects of falling appropriations on tuition and financial aid spending.  
This is an important topic, but it not our interest in this paper. 
  Rajindar K Koshal and Manjulinka Koshal (2000) estimate a model of state 
appropriations using a single cross section of states in 1990.   They build a two-equation 
structure with one equation for tuition at state supported institutions and one equation for 
state appropriations for higher education.  They posit correctly that the causation between 
tuition and state appropriations is two-way.  While they confirm the two-way causation 
which is their focus, their model does not provide us much guidance.  In particular, per 
capita state revenue is an important explanatory variable in their equation for state 
appropriations.  In our study we do not want to hold tax revenues constant.  The tax 
revolt limitations may well affect appropriations to higher education by affecting tax 
revenues.   To capture this, we have to allow tax revenues to vary. 
  Thomas Kane, Peter R. Orszag, and David Gunter (2003) also estimate a model of 
state appropriations for higher education.  They use panel data for 48 states from 1977-
2001, though data availability does not allow them to use all years in some cases.  They 
hypothesize that other spending priorities, specifically spending on Medicaid and 
Corrections, have crowded higher education spending out of the budget.  They provide 
evidence for this hypothesis the case of Medicaid, but fail to find any support in the case 
of Corrections.  Also, like Koshal and Koshal, Kane, Orszag and Gunter include total 
state revenue as an explanatory variable.    13 
In microeconomics terms, using state revenue as an explanatory variable allows 
these authors to determine the extent to which higher education spending, the corrections 
budget, and health spending are net substitutes within a given state budget (i.e. holding 
the budget constant).  Within a budget of a given size if spending on Medicaid is rising 
due to federal mandates or incentives, some other components of the budget must fall.   
Kane, Orszag and Gunter have demonstrated that higher education spending is one such 
component.  But if the budget itself is endogenous, these expenditure categories may be 
gross complements instead.  In other words if revenues rise (fall) by five percent, 
spending on higher education and on Medicaid may both increase (decrease).  Their 
results therefore capture the effect of limited revenues on higher education appropriations 
when there are pressures to increase spending on other budget items.  But they are silent 
about the determinants of these revenues, which is part of our story.   
  Koshal and Koshal (2000) and Kane, Orszag, and Gunter (2003) both use data 
that start after the slowdown shown in Figure 1.  Our aim is to explain the whole picture, 
both the increases in funding in the 1960s and early 1970s and the decreases in funding in 
the late 1970s and the 1980s and 1990s.  Our data will start with fiscal year 1961.  This is 
important because with data starting in the early 1960s our identification of an effect of 
the tax revolt institutions will be based not only on cross-section variation among states 
with and without these provisions but also on time series variation within the states that 
adopted the provisions during our sample period. 
 
IV. Empirical Model    14 
To evaluate the relationship between state higher education effort and the 
institutional variables that capture the tax revolt’s impact we estimate an empirical model 
that takes the following form: 
 
  Eit = E(TELit, SMRit, , Pit, SSit,,  Dit,, Sti, Yrt) .           (1) 
 
The dependent variable is state appropriation effort for higher education.  The subscript i 
codes for the state and the subscript t refers to year.  The two institutional variables are 
tax and expenditure limits (TEL) and supermajority requirements (SMR).  If the 
institutional constraints have an impact on effort, our statistical model should pick up this 
independent effect in the coefficients on TELS and SMRs.  The variables Pit, SSit , and , 
Dit , are vectors, respectively, of state-level political variables, other state spending, and 
demographic controls.  These variables are discussed in detail below. 
   Because we are pooling cross-section and time series data we include state (Sti) 
and year (Yrt) fixed effects in addition to the other controls.  State fixed effects control 
for long lasting but unobservable differences between the states that influence higher 
education effort, while the time fixed effect controls for unobservable year effects that are 
common across the states.  Fixed effects models of this sort have advantages and 
disadvantages.  Adding dummy variables for each state and for every year consumes 
degrees of freedom, and since the coefficients on these dummy variables are capturing 
the effects of many unobserved influences we must be careful not to attribute specific 
meaning to their sign and magnitude.  On the other hand, alternatives to fixed effects 
models, such as error-components models, make explicit assumptions about the structure   15 
of the error term that we cannot justify.  Since we have a large data set, the fixed effects 
model (using ordinary least squares) is the appropriate estimation technique. 
Dependent Variable - The dependent variable for our analysis is state 
appropriations per $1000 of personal income.  State appropriations for higher education 
are tax fund appropriations for the current operations of state institutions of higher 
education, for state coordinating boards, and for state scholarship programs.  They 
explicitly exclude appropriations for capital outlay, appropriations of resources derived 
from other sources, e.g.  Federal sources or tuition, and they do not include funds derived 
from lotteries.  These data are collected by the Grapevine project at the Illinois State 
University.  State personal income is estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of 
the Department of Commerce.
12 
Tax Revolt Variables – We use indicator variables for the presence of TELs and 
SMRs.  Also, as we explain below, we separate our TEL variable according to various 
properties of the TEL. 
Variables for Other State Spending – State expenditures on higher education 
may be related to state needs in other areas, particularly spending on health care and on 
corrections.  We use data from the Bureau of the Census on state government finances for 
Total Direct Expenditures on Corrections and Total Direct Expenditures for Health and 
Hospitals to capture these effects.  We express theses variables as expenditures per 
$1,000 of state personal income.    
Since expenditures on health and hospitals and expenditures on corrections are 
determined by the same political process as are expenditures on higher education, we test 
                                                 
12 By choosing this dependent variable we are implicitly assuming that the income elasticity of higher 
education appropriations is one, i.e., that the correct function is: 
     Higher Education Appropriations= E(TELit, SMRit, Dit, SSit, Pit, Sti, Yrt) • Personal Income.   16 
whether these variables can be used as exogenous variables in a regression determining 
higher education effort.  To determine if we should use an instrumental variables 
procedure instead of OLS for our estimates, we performed a Hausman test.
13  We used 
state-level statistics on the rate of major crimes and on the crude death rate as 
instruments.
14  The Hausman test indicated that there is not a systematic difference 
between the instrumental variables and ordinary least squares regression coefficients.
15  
We also performed a Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) test for weak instruments.  In this 
case we could reject the hypothesis of weak instruments.
16  These test results give us 
confidence that the ordinary least squares results we present are not tainted by 
simultaneous equations bias. 
Control Variables for State Politics – Our equations need to control for state 
ideology and party affiliation of elected officials.  We will use seven variables.   The first 
variable is a measure of state citizen ideology from the work of William D. Berry, Evan 
J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson (1998).
17 This variable combines 
ratings for the ideology of the state’s Congressional delegation from the Americans for 
Democratic Action and the AFL/CIO’s Committee on Political Education.  This rating is 
designed so that the maximum score of one hundred is given to an extreme liberal, and 
the minimum score of zero is given to an extreme conservative.  The ratings for the 
                                                 
13 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991). 
14 The rate of major crime comes from the Uniform Crime Reports published by the Department of Justice, 
and the death rate comes from Vital Statistics of the United States published by the Department of Health 
and Human Services. 
15 The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the coefficients from OLS and Instrumental Variable 
regression are not systematically different.  In our case the test statistic of 18.85, which is distributed Chi-
Squared with 99 degrees of freedom, is clearly in the fail to reject region. 
16 The null hypothesis for the Bound, Jaeger, and Baker test is that the instruments are weak.  For Health 
and Hospitals the test statistic, which is distributed F with 2 and 1805 degrees of freedom, was 4.85, clearly 
in the reject region.  For Corrections, the test statistic, which has the same distribution, was 10.45, yielding 
another rejection. 
17 This measure has been updated through 2002.  These data can be found at 
www.icpsr.umich.edu:8080/ICPSR-STUDY/01208.xml (accessed June 11, 2004).   17 
members of the state’s Congressional delegation are averaged to get the rating for the 
state’s citizens.   
For party affiliation we included three indicator variables each of which is equal 
to one if the Democratic Party controls, respectively, the governorship, a majority of the 
lower house in the legislature, or a majority of the upper house in the legislature, and zero 
otherwise.  To capture potential shifts in the ideological content of party affiliation, we 
also interacted each of these variables with an indicator variable equal to one in 1980 and 
thereafter.  We chose 1980 as the break because of the profound effect of the Reagan 
presidency and the political transformation of the south.  As Alexander Lamis (1984) 
demonstrates, the number of state-wide elected officials (Governors and Senators) from 
the Republican Party in the south increased dramatically in 1980.  Also, the work of Earl 
Black and Merle Black (2002) suggests that the rise of southern republicans that started 
in 1980 caused southern democrats to shift ideological positions.  They argue that in 
many cases Democratic Party elites were outflanked on the right by the new Republicans, 
so the party leadership became more moderate.
18    
Other Control Variables – All of our regressions have a full set of indicator 
variables for state and year effects.
19  In addition, to control for the possibility of scale 
effects that might vary by state size and differences in the age structure of states we 
include the four variables Besley and Case (2003) use as controls in their regressions.  
These are the percentage of the state population in the 5 to17 age group, the percentage of 
                                                 
18 We recognize the ad hoc nature of this procedure.  While the evidence in Lamis (1984) suggests that 
1980 is a likely candidate for a break, we cannot be sure it is the best break point.   In our defense, this is 
the only break we investigated.  It is not the result of a data mining exercise. 
19 The presence of indicator variables for the states precludes using similar variables for regions, which are 
often found in analyses of state higher education policy.  There are very likely to be regional differences in 
higher education policies, but including regional variables rather than state variables forces each state in a 
region to have the same coefficient and leads to a poorer fitting model.  We provide an analysis of regional 
differences below.       18 
the state population over age 65, the state population, and the state population squared.  
Lastly, we have included the percentage of the state population in the prime college going 
age group, 18-24 year olds.
20   
Following Besley and Case (2003) as well as Kane Orzag and Gunter (2003), we 
started with a panel data set of the forty-eight continental states from 1960 through 2000.  
Including variables for party affiliation in the upper and lower houses of the state 
legislature required us to eliminate Nebraska because of its unicameral legislature.  Also, 
the state of Minnesota did not have partisan elections for the state legislature prior to 
1973, so there is no information on the party affiliation of legislators in Minnesota for 
1960 through 1972.  Because of these considerations we have a data set with 1914 
observations; 46 states for 41 years and one state for 28 years.
21  Table 5 gives the means, 




Table 6 contains our results.
22  Equation 1 uses the simplest measures of the tax 
revolt variables, indicator variables for the presence of a TEL and the presence of an 
SMR.  Both variables have statistically significant coefficients of the expected sign.  The 
two tax revolt provisions reduce higher education taxpayer effort.  Together they can 
explain over half of the observed decline in effort over the period. 
                                                 
20 The Bureau of the Census did not publish annual estimates of state population that included the 18-24 
year old population for the 1960s.  Our data for the 1960s were our own estimates based on data for 
population by individual ages from the 1960 census.   We then aged these population figures with an 
allowance for migration and mortality.  Details of these estimates are available on request from the authors.   
21 For comparability with Besley and Case (2003) and Kane, Orzag and Gunter (2003), we did produce 
results for all 48 states by eliminating the legislative variables.  These results were very similar to the 
results we present below. 
22 The full results, including all the control variables and the state and time indicator variables are available 
on request from the authors.   19 
The two variables for other state spending have positive signs, which indicates 
that spending on corrections and on health and hospitals are complements to higher 
education spending.  As we noted earlier, results suggesting that other state spending 
crowds out higher education come from regressions that control for total state spending, 
i.e., they demonstrate that, for a given level of state spending, more spending on 
corrections and/or health and hospitals will lead to less spending on higher education.  
Our regressions do not control for total state spending.  They indicate that where and 
when there is more spending for corrections, and particularly for health and hospitals, 
there is also more spending for higher education.  This result likely reflects differences in 
tastes for public goods that overpower any effect from budget tradeoffs.  The results for 
Corrections and Health and Hospitals are very consistent across the various specifications 
of the TEL variable in the remainder of the table.  
 The control for state ideology also has a statistically significant coefficient.  More 
liberal states have higher state appropriation effort for higher education.  The coefficient 
on this variable is very stable across the various specifications of the TEL variable in the 
remainder of the table.  The two variables measuring the effect of a democratic governor 
suggest that prior to 1980, states with democratic governors had lower state 
appropriations for higher education, but in 1980 and thereafter, when the effect of a 
Democratic governor is measured by the sum of the two coefficients, the sign of the 
coefficient for Democratic Governor changes.  The sum of the two coefficients is not 
statistically significant in the first two specifications, but it is in the second two.
23  The 
coefficients on the variables for the party affiliation of the legislature also show that the 
                                                 
23 The F statistic for the test that the sum of the two coefficients 1 and 1809 degrees of freedom.  It is 2.00, 
2.59, 8.71 and 12.69 for columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.  The first two are not statistically significant, 
but the last two are.   20 
break in 1980 is important.  The results for the lower house mirror those for the party 
affiliation of the governor.  Prior to 1980, having a majority of the lower house from the 
Democratic Party had a detrimental effect on state spending on higher education.  In 1980 
and thereafter, when the effect of a Democratic majority is found by summing the two 
coefficients, the effect changes sign.  In this case, the sum of the two coefficients is not 
statistically significant in any of the specifications.
24   The results for the upper house are 
different.  In this case, both before and after 1980, a democratic majority is associated 
with increased higher education funding, but the effect after 1980 is much diminished.  In 
fact, in 1980 and thereafter, when the effect is measured by the sum of the coefficients, 
none of the summed coefficients are statistically significant.
25   
Equation (2) investigates the distinction between restrictive TELs and non-
restrictive TELs suggested in Besley and Case.  The coefficients on the two indicator 
variables have the same sign and roughly the same magnitude.  This distinction does not 
appear to be meaningful for the effect of a TEL on taxpayer effort to support higher 
education.
26  We interpret this to mean that the presence of an explicit limit, even one that 
is only advisory or easy to circumvent, has a dampening effect on higher education effort.  
In the results that follow, we will not continue to use this distinction. 
Equation (3) distinguishes between broad-based TELs that include tuition, and 
narrow-based TELs that do not.  The result here is striking.  The coefficient on TELs that 
                                                 
24 The F statistic for the test that the sum of the two coefficients 1 and 1809 degrees of freedom.  It is 2.29, 
3.78, 1.06, and 1.16 for columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.  None of these F statistics are large enough to 
allow us to reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is zero. 
25 The F statistic for the test that the sum of the two coefficients 1 and 1809 degrees of freedom.  It is 1.00, 
1.17, 0.25, and 0.11 for columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.  None of these F statistics are large enough to 
allow us to reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is zero. 
26 The test statistic for the difference between these two coefficients is distributed F with 1 and 1810 
degrees of freedom.  This test statistic is 1.18, which is not sufficiently large to reject the hypothesis that 
his difference is zero, i.e., the two coefficients have the same value.   21 
include tuition is very large and highly statistically significant while the coefficient on 
TELs that do not include tuition is much smaller, though still statistically significant.  
This suggests that very broad-based TELs create much stronger downward pressure on 
spending because there is little leeway for legislatures or governors to find unrestricted 
funding sources for activities.  In these states, the TEL has considerably more bite than in 
other states.  The coefficient for SMR is still statistically significant, though its 
magnitude is diminished compared to the first two equations.  
We bring the distinction between fixed-base and moving base TELs into our final 
estimation.  Conveniently for our study, exactly three of the six states that include tuition 
in their TEL have a moving-based TEL while the other three have a fixed-base TEL.  The 
results in equation (4) indicate that for states with broad-based TELs a moving-based 
formula has led to a greater effect than a fixed-base formula.  This is what we expected.  
In both of the cases, broad-based TELs restrict higher education effort, but it is more 
severely restricted in the states with limits on the growth of state spending rather than on 
its level.  The results for the states that do not include tuition in the TEL are puzzling.  In 
this case moving-base TELs do not appear to affect taxpayer effort for higher education, 
while fixed-base TELs have the expected negative effect.  In this specification the 
coefficient on the super majority requirement variable is no longer statistically 
significant.     
The tax revolt clearly has had a statistically significant effect on taxpayer effort 
on behalf of higher education, though the magnitude of this effect varies with the type of 
TEL.  The data behind Figure 1 indicate that nationwide taxpayer effort peaked in 1976 
and 1978 at $10.56 per $1,000 of personal income and fell to $7.84 in 2001.  With the   22 
exception of two earlier SMRs in Arkansas (1934) and Florida (1971), all of the tax 
revolt policies were initiated in 1976 or thereafter.  Our indicator variables therefore 
primarily affect estimates for the period in which national average taxpayer effort fell a 
bit less than $3.00 per $1,000 of personal income.  The coefficients for TEL of -.8759 
and for SMR of -.4783 in Equation 1 then are quite large.  The presence of a TEL 
accounts for slightly more than one third of the average decline while the presence of an 
SMR accounts for roughly one fifth of the average decline.  Our other results suggest that 
this effect has not been uniform across states.  States with very broad-based TELs have 
experienced much greater declines in higher education effort than have other states. 
The final table, Table 7, gives the average values of the coefficients for the state 
indicator variables from equation 1 by region along with the F-value for the hypothesis 
that this average value equals zero.   The omitted state was Alabama, so the coefficients 
for the state indicator variables measure, other things held constant, the state specific 
effects relative to the state of Alabama.  The table indicates our results are consistent with 
earlier findings concerning regional effects on higher education appropriations.
27  
Specifically, they show that the Northeast (New England and Middle Atlantic), the Upper 
Midwest regions (East and West North Central) and the South Atlantic have 
systematically lower tax effort for higher education than Alabama while states in the 
remainder of the regions do not.   In each case these regional averages are statistically 
significantly different from zero.   The regional averages for the remaining regions are 
not statistically different from zero.   The results for New England clearly are the most 
                                                 
27 See for example, Hearn, Griswold, and Marine (1996).    23 
striking and can probably be traced to the prevalence of private colleges and universities 
in this region.
28   
We can extract two conclusions from our empirical results.  First, our findings 
clearly indicate that the tax revolt provisions do affect higher education spending.  As we 
discussed in Section II, previous attempts to measure the effects of tax revolt provisions 
have had mixed results.  These other studies all focused on the total state budget while we 
focus on one of its components.  If the studies that found a significant link between the 
tax revolt provisions and the total budget are correct, then our finding is that higher 
education spending is reduced by these provisions along with the rest of the budget.  
Alternatively, the tax revolt limitations may affect the composition of spending and not 
its level.  If this is true, our results suggest that higher education spending is more 
vulnerable than are other spending categories.
 29  In any event, our results clearly suggest 
that the tax revolt provisions do matter.  The second conclusion is a corollary to the first. 
Since the tax revolt provisions account for significant portion of the slowdown in 
taxpayer effort directed toward higher education, studies of state higher education 
spending should not ignore institutions such as TELs and SMRs.  Also, given the 
importance of these institutions, strategies to improve higher education funding that 
ignore them may well not be useful.  
 
VI.  Policy Implications 
                                                 
28  We did not include the prevalence of private colleges and universities as an explanatory variable because 
this effect is largely captured in the state indicator variable, as this regional example demonstrates.   
29Even if TELs and SMRs do not reduce state spending, they may slow its growth.  Higher education’s 
share of the budget might not do well in the resulting budget crunch.  Since colleges and universities have 
tuition as an alternative revenue source – while, for example, prisons do not – legislators may use 
reductions in higher education appropriations to cushion other parts of the budget.    24 
  The notion that a TEL can have a very influential effect on higher education 
policy will not surprise anyone familiar with recent changes in higher education financing 
in Colorado.  Starting in fall 2005, Colorado will dramatically reduce its funding for 
colleges and universities while instituting a voucher that goes directly to students.
30  
While there is a constituency for funding college and university students directly using 
vouchers, the fiscal environment created by Colorado’s TEL probably had more to do 
with the passage of this reform.
31  The TEL in Colorado, called the Taxpayers Bill of 
Rights (TABOR), is of the most restrictive type.  In the language of this paper, it is a TEL 
that includes tuition and has a moving base.  The appeal of the voucher proposal to the 
major universities is a legal provision allowing state entities receiving less than ten 
percent of their revenues from state appropriations to achieve “enterprise status.”  With 
this status they are exempted from the TABOR limitations.  This exemption will allow 
them to use tuition increases more freely to make up for lost direct funding from the state 
and to meet future cost increases. 
  Though extreme, the Colorado case illustrates the problems public colleges and 
universities face in most states as the financial compact between the states and their 
public higher education institutions continues to erode.  A good higher education system 
has two basic attributes:  high quality and full access for qualified students regardless of 
means.  From the end of the Second World War to roughly 1980, most states used some 
form of the low-tuition low-financial aid model to achieve these goals.  So long as 
sufficient resources are flowing from the state, low tuition can guarantee access without 
compromising educational quality.  But when resource constraints tighten, the states – 
                                                 
30 See Alexander Russo (2004) for a discussion of the changes in Colorado. 
31 See Robert B. Archibald and David H. Feldman (2004) for a discussion of the reasons to support direct 
funding of students at state-supported colleges and universities.   25 
and their public universities – must face an unpleasant tradeoff between access and 
quality.  Higher tuition can preserve quality, but at the cost of diminished access. 
High quality and full access also can be achieved using a high-tuition high-
financial aid policy.   Supporters of the high-high policy argue that the state 
appropriations needed to finance low tuition for all students amount to a very poorly 
targeted state subsidy.
32  Many students attending state-supported colleges and 
universities are from very well-to-do families fully capable of paying much more than the 
current tuition.  Subsidizing them improves neither quality nor access, while it increases 
the fiscal footprint of higher education.     
While not denying this logic, proponents of the low-low strategy argue that the 
substantial need-based financial aid required for full access under a high tuition policy 
would be hard to sustain politically.  Attempts to implement the high-high strategy would 
not yield high-high but rather high-low.  This argument for a low-low strategy is based on 
the concept of targeting within universalism.
33  Social security is an example.  If social 
security were available only to low-income elderly, the program likely would not have 
very wide support, but because everyone over age 65 is eligible it has great political 
appeal.  Advocates of social security will admit that some of the beneficiaries have no 
need for the money.  While this may be unfortunate, the more important point is that 
members of the target group – the low-income elderly – are being aided.  To get the 
government assistance to the target group, the benefit has to be embedded in a universal 
program.  The parallels to tuition policy should be clear.  Low tuition for all creates a 
                                                 
32 This view is typically advocated by economists.  For early expressions of this view see, for example, 
Milton Friedman (1968), W. Lee. Hansen and Burton. A. Weisbrod (1969) and the Carnegie Commission 
on Higher Education (1973).  
33 See William Julius Wilson (1987) and Theda Skocpol (1995).   26 
broad base of political support for spending on higher education, and it keeps the price 
down for low-income students.
34  
Although the political appeal of the low-low strategy seems clear, state 
appropriations for higher education have not kept pace with the cost of providing a high 
quality education.  As a result, many states have allowed tuition increases that far outpace 
the inflation rate.  These large tuition increases have received a great deal of national 
attention.  Authority to increase tuition has not been as forthcoming in other states, and as 
a result the quality of the education offered by state-supported colleges and universities in 
these states has declined.  This outcome has received much less national attention.   
Neither outcome is desirable.  Unless states that have allowed tuition to soar also have 
increased their spending on financial aid accordingly, they are moving in the direction of 
the high-low strategy which restricts access for low-income students.  If tuition is kept 
low but the institutions are starved, access may seem to have been preserved, but if 
course offerings are reduced or places in classes are rationed then access is circumscribed 
in other ways.  And if program quality suffers, access to the resulting institution is 
unlikely to be as worthwhile.   
Our results imply that turning the clock back to the early 1970s is a difficult 
enterprise.   Attacking the tax and expenditure limitations or the supermajority 
requirements would require a pro-tax coalition that is stronger than the anti-tax forces 
that implemented them.  But there is no evidence that support for these explicit 
limitations is waning.  Higher education advocates are forced into the uncomfortable 
position of arguing that incremental budget support for higher education is more 
                                                 
34 The arguments in the high-high vs. low-low debate are much more subtle and extensive than our brief 
discussion may suggest.  Interested readers should see the excellent review of this literature in James C. 
Hearn, Carolyn P. Griswold and Ginger M. Marine (1996).   27 
important than other state services.  This is a difficult case to make, given the demands of 
budget competitors like K-12 education, Medicaid, and highway infrastructure.   
 If a return to low-low is unlikely, the road to high-high has some potholes as 
well.   First, a college president or the leader of a state-system often is hired for, and 
evaluated on, his or her expertise in extracting funds from the legislature.  Advising that 
leader not to resist tuition increases and to support increased funding for need-based 
financial aid instead of support for his or her institution is advice to fail at state fund 
raising.  Also, in the current environment, state need-based aid is growing much less 
rapidly than is state merit-based aid.  Need-based aid isn’t the popular option.  Many 
states are expanding merit-based aid, and one state (Georgia) has replaced its entire need-
based program with one based on merit.   
  Yet the case for high-high remains viable.  Advocates of low-low implicitly 
assume that the aid needed to make high-high work must come from the state, and that 
this makes high-high politically unsustainable.  But states are increasingly willing to let 
their public institutions behave more like private universities in a number of dimensions.  
Public universities could treat the published tuition as a list price and offer internal 
discounts based on need as private universities have done for years.  This way, much of 
the aid needed to preserve access would come from internal grants.  Continued state 
support of university operating budgets and aid funds would help keep the list price lower 
than it otherwise would be, but state financing would not be the single key to making 
high-high work.  This degree of independence from the state is likely to be an attractive 
option for the strongest state supported institutions; those that compete effectively with   28 
private colleges and universities currently.
35  It is not likely to be a successful strategy for 
community colleges or less well known state colleges and universities. 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
 
Our results clearly support two conclusions.  First, the two tax revolt institutions – 
tax and expenditure limits and supermajority requirements – have had a significant 
adverse effect on state appropriations for higher education per $1000 of state personal 
income.  Second, not all tax and expenditure limitations have the same effect.  Broadly 
based limitations have much stronger effects than more narrowly based ones.  We show 
that these provisions, which became popular starting in the late 1970s and expanded in 
the 1980s and 1990s, play an important role in explaining the difficulties that have 
plagued many state higher education systems in maintaining state appropriations during 
the same time period.  In states with these provisions, the rules have changed to the 
detriment of higher education.  
On their face these results might not seem surprising.  If there are legal limits on 
taxes or expenditures, these limits likely would affect spending on higher education along 
with other spending.  On the other hand, although TELs and SMRs are products of the tax 
revolt, they are not the only product.  Attitudes about government and legislative 
behavior changed too.  Strong resistance to increases in taxes or spending is a feature of 
many a successful legislative campaign in states that do not have a TEL or an SMR.  Our 
results suggest that even in an environment which is very hostile to taxes and government 
spending, the presence of explicit limitations has a noticeable effect.  The fact that a 
majority of these provisions are cast in constitutional concrete adds more significance to 
                                                 
35 Three universities in Virginia are proposing to become quasi-private entities that control tuition and 
financial aid policy.  See Pamela Burdman (2004) for a discussion.   29 
the results.  It will not be easy for supporters of increases in funding for higher education 
to succeed in states which have these provisions.             30 
References 
 
Abrams, Burton A. and William R. Dougan, “The Effects of Constitutional Restraints on 
Government Spending,” Public Choice, 49, (1986) pp 101-116. 
 
Archibald, Robert B. and David H. Feldman, “Direct Funding of Students at Public 
Colleges and Universities,” NACUBO Business Officer, October 2004, pp. 27-32. 
 
Bails, Dale and Martie A. Tieslau, “The Impact of Fiscal Constitutions on State and 
Local Expenditures,” Cato Journal, 20, pp. 255-227. 
 
Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russel L. Hanson, 
“Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States,” American 
Journal of Political Science, 42 (1998) pp. 327-348. 
 
Besley, Thomas and Anne Case, “Political Institutions and Policy Choices, Evidence 
from the United States,” Journal of Economic Literature, XLI (2003) pp. 7-73. 
 
Black, Earl and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, (Harvard University 
Press, 2002). 
Bound, John, David A. Jaeger, and Regina Baker, "Problems with Instrumental Variables 
Estimation When the Correlation between the Instruments and the Endogenous 
Explanatory Variable is Weak," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90 (430) 
June 1995, pp. 443-450.  
Burdman, Pamela, “Has the State Become an Albatross?  Some of Virginia’s public 
universities and seeking greater freedom to set tuition,” National CrossTalk, 12, (2004).  
 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Higher Education:  Who Pays? Who 
Benefits? Who Should Pay (McGraw Hill, 1973). 
 
Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy.  New York: Harper Collins, 1957. 
 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., Tuition Rising:  Why College Costs So Much (Harvard University 
Press, 2000). 
 
Friedman, Milton, “The Higher Schooling in America,” Public Interest, 11, (1968) pp. 
108-112.  
 
Gilligan, Thomas W., and John G. Matsusaka, “Deviation from Constituent Interests:  
The Role of Legislative Structure and Political Parties in the States,” Economic Inquiry, 
33 (July 1995), pp. 383-401. 
   31 
Griswold, Carolyn P. and Ginger Minton Marine, “Political Influences on State Policy:  
Higher-Tuition, Higher-Aid, and the Real World,” The Review of Higher Education, 19 
(1996) pp. 361-389. 
 
Hansen, W. Lee and Burton A Weisbrod, Benefits, Costs, and Finance of Public Higher 
Education (Markham Publishing, 1973). 
 
Hauptman, Arthur M. The College Tuition Spiral:  An Examination of Why Charges Are 
Increasing (American Council of Education and the College Board, 1990). 
 
Hearn, James C., Carolyn P. Griswold, and Ginger M. Marine, “Region, Resources, and 
Reason:  A Contextual Analysis of State Tuition and Student Aid Policies,” Research in 
Higher Education, 37, (1996), pp. 241-278. 
 
Hossler, Don, Jon P. Lund, Jackie Ramin, Sara Westfall, and Steve Irish, “State Funding 
for Higher Education:  The Sisyphean Task, The Journal of Higher Educaiton, 8, (1997) 
pp. 160-190. 
 
Kane, Thomas J., Peter R. Orszag, and David L. Gunter, “State Fiscal Constraints and 
Higher Education Spending:  The Role of Medicaid and the Business Cycle,” Discussion 
Paper No. 11, The Brookings Institution, May 2003.  
 
Knight, Brian G., “Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases:  Evidence 
from the States,” Journal of Public Economics, 76, (2000) pp. 41-67. 
 
Koshal, Rajindar K., and Manjulika Koshal, “State Appropriations and Higher Education 
Tuition:  what is the relationship?” Education Economics, 8, (2000), pp. 81-89. 
 
Lamis, Alexander, The Two-party South, (Oxford University Press, 1984). 
 
Lowry, Robert C., “The effects of state political interests and campus outputs on public 
university revenues,” Economics of Education Review, 20, (2001) pp. 105-119. 
 
Matsusaka, John, “Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 
Years.” Journal of Political Economy, 103 (June 1995), pp. 587-623. 
 
Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal, “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled 
Agendas, and the Status Quo,” Public Choice, 33, (#4 1978), pp. 27-43. 
 
Rueben, Kim, “Tax Limitations and Government Growth:  The Effect of State Tax and 
Expenditure Limits on State and Local Government,” California Institute of Public 
Policy, 1997. 
 
Russo, Alexander, “Varsity Vouchers:  Colorado has come up with a novel way to fund 
higher education.  Send money to the students.” State Legislatures, (June 2004), page 27. 
   32 
Shadbegian, Ronald J., “Do Tax and Expenditure Limitations Affect the Size and Growth 
of State Government?” Contemporary Economic Policy, 14, (1996) pp 22-36. 
 
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast, “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and 
Legislative Choice,” Public Choice, 37, (#3 1981), pp. 503-19. 
 
Skocpol, Theda, "Targeting Within Universalism, Politically Viable Policies to Combat 
Poverty in the United States,"  chapter 8 of Social Policy in the United States:  Future 
Possibilities in Historical Perspective.   Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1995. 
 
Tabellini, Guido, and Alberto Alesina, “Voting on the Budget Deficit,” American 
Economic Review, 80, (1990), pp. 37-49. 
 
Wilson, William Julius, The Truly Disadvantaged:  The Inner City, the Underclass, and 
Public Policy.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
 
   33 
Table 1.  Tax and Expenditure Limitations 
 










AK  1982  Const.  Restrictive  Fixed  No 
AZ  1978  Const.  Restrictive  Fixed  Yes 
CA  1979  Const.  Restrictive  Fixed  No 
CO  1977  Stat -1991 
Const - 1992 
Non-Restrictive  Moving  Yes 
CT  1991  Const.  Non-Restrictive  Moving  No 
FL  1994  Const.  Non-Restrictive  Moving  No 
HI  1978  Const.  Restrictive  Moving  No 
ID  1978  Stat.  Restrictive  Fixed  No 
LA  1979  Stat-1979 
Const- 1993 
Non-Restrictive  Fixed  No 
MA  1986  Stat.  Restrictive  Moving  No 
MI  1978  Const.  Restrictive  Fixed  No 
MO  1980  Const.  Restrictive  Fixed  No 
MT  1981  Stat.  Restrictive  Moving  No 
NC  1991  Stat.  Non-Restrictive  Fixed  Yes 
NJ  1976  Stat.  Restrictive  Moving  No 
NV  1979  Stat.  Non-Restrictive -1981 
Restrictive - 1995 
Fixed  Yes 
OK  1985  Const.  Restrictive  Moving  No 
OR  1979  Stat.  Non-Restrictive  Moving  Yes 
SC  1980  Const.  Restrictive  Moving  No 
TN  1978  Const.  Non-Restrictive  Moving  No 
TX  1978  Const.  Non-Restrictive  Moving  No 
UT  1979  Stat.  Non-Restrictive  Mix of Fixed 
and Moving 
No 
WA  1979  Stat.  Restrictive  Moving  Yes 
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Table 2.  Characteristics of Super Majority Requirements 
 
State  Year   Voting Requirements 
AR  1934  3/4 or voter approval 
AZ  1992  2/3 
CA  1978  2/3 
CO  1992  2/3 temporary and then voter approval 
DE  1980  3/5 
FL  1971  3/5 
LA  1996  2/3 
MS  1970  3/5 
NV  1996  2/3 emergency and then voter approval 
OK  1996  3/4 or voter approval 
OR  1996  3/5 
SD  1978  2/3 
WA  1993  2/3 for revenue increases under the expenditure limit 
otherwise voter approval 
 
   35 
Table 3.  Years of Peak Effort by State 
 
Years   States  
1966  SD           
1967             
1968             
1969             
1970  VT           
1971  CO  HI  IL  MT  OR   
1972  IN  LA         
1973             
1974  AZ  GA  ME  WA  WI   
1975  FL  PA  SC       
1976  DE  MD  MI  NH  NY  WV 
1977  ID  MO  NV       
1978  CT  MN  NE  NJ  UT   
1979  KS  KY  MS  RI  TN  VA 
1980  CA           
1981             
1982  AK  NC  ND  TX     
1983  OK           
1984             
1985  NM           
1986  AL  AR         
1987             
1988  MA           
1989  OH  WY         
1990             
1991  IA             36 
Table 4.  State Appropriations for Higher Education per $1,000 of Personal Income in Rank 
Order, FY 1961, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 
 
       1961                   1970                      1980                     1990                          2000 
Rank  State   Effort  State  Effort  State  Effort  State  Effort  State   Effort 
1  MA  $.98  MA  $3.89  NH  $4.28  NH  $3.23  NH  $2.72 
2  NJ  1.35  NJ  4.25  MA  6.47  MA  6.45  VT  4.30 
3  MD  1.54  NH  4.38  NJ  7.44  VT  6.47  MA  5.07 
4  NY  1.64  CT  6.09  OH  7.53  CT  6.51  NY  5.44 
5  CT  1.78  MD  6.30  CT  7.53  NJ  6.58  RI  5.50 
6  PA  1.80  OH  6.31  PA  7.61  PA  6.66  NJ  5.53 
7  OH  2.04  PA  7.71  ME  7.62  RI  7.04  CT  5.57 
8  MO  2.73  NV  7.74  VT  7.72  MO  7.13  PA  5.67 
9  ME  3.08  DE  7.77  NV  8.09  FL  7.19  NV  5.88 
10  TN  3.11  VA  7.93  MO  8.30  NV  7.50  CO  6.07 
11  VA  3.11  NY  8.07  MD  8.71  OH  7.89  FL  6.52 
12  DE  3.12  OK  8.07  IL  8.78  IL  8.09  MD  6.59 
13  NH  3.13  TN  8.20  WA  8.98  MD  8.56  MO  7.03 
14  RI  3.16  MO  8.28  FL  8.99  NY  8.62  OH  7.04 
15  IL  3.34  AL  8.36  IN  9.27  GA  8.82  IL  7.11 
16  TX  3.54  RI  8.73  NY  9.70  MI  8.87  ME  7.23 
17  SC  3.67  IN  8.91  RI  9.74  SD  8.90  MT  7.31 
18  FL  3.86  MI  8.99  MI  9.94  CO  8.97  TN  7.34 
19  KY  4.09  ME  9.10  MT  9.99  OR  8.99  SD  7.45 
20  AK  4.12  IL  9.11  DE  10.29  ME  9.12  WA  7.58 
21  GA  4.14  CA  9.18  SD  10.32  DE  9.24  AZ  7.67 
22  NC  4.25  NE  9.19  GA  10.42  LA  9.37  VA  7.68 
23  WI  4.32  FL  9.50  CO  10.45  IN  9.50  OR  7.72 
24  CA  4.40  GA  9.59  VA  10.45  VA  9.72  GA  7.76 
25  AL  4.49  AK  9.79  OK  10.63  TN  9.86  WI  7.80 
26  VT  4.71  MS  9.80  OR  10.77  AZ  9.93  MI  7.88 
27  IN  4.86  SD  9.83  TN  10.91  CA  9.94  TX  7.95 
28  MN  5.30  MN  10.00  IA  11.45  OK  10.03  DE  8.03 
29  MI  5.35  LA  10.03  AR  11.63  WI  10.18  IN  8.22 
30  NV  5.35  VT  10.06  LA  11.66  MT  10.23  CA  8.27 
31  NE  5.39  TX  10.12  ND  11.68  TX  10.28  LA  9.06 
32  HI  5.64  AR  10.40  NE  11.91  WA  10.40  MN  9.19 
33  WV  5.71  SC  10.70  AZ  12.18  AR  10.51  SC  9.38 
34  CO  6.02  IA  10.94  WI  12.20  KS  10.83  KS  9.57 
35  UT  6.05  KY  10.99  KY  12.24  WV  10.94  WV  9.87 
36  MS  6.09  KS  11.01  WV  12.28  KY  11.02  OK  9.92 
37  KS  6.14  WI  11.09  TX  12.32  NE  11.67  AK  10.30 
38  WA  6.26  MT  11.72  KS  12.67  ID  11.85  ID  10.32 
39  OK  6.35  WV  12.13  ID  12.75  IA  12.46  KY  10.50 
40  AZ  6.36  CO  12.15  WY  12.78  MN  12.53  HI  10.74 
41  NM  6.41  AZ  12.62  CA  12.81  SC  12.78  UT  10.93 
42  WY  6.46  OR  12.69  AL  13.83  UT  13.17  NE  10.97 
43  AR  6.54  NC  12.77  MN  14.08  HI  13.69  AR  11.25 
44  IA  6.62  UT  13.40  UT  14.45  AL  13.94  AL  11.40 
45  OR  7.09  NM  13.42  HI  14.64  MS  14.37  WY  11.52 
46  SD  7.81  WY  13.66  NC  14.91  NC  14.56  IA  11.56 
47  ID  8.46  ND  13.77  NM  16.17  NM  14.93  NC  11.79 
48  LA  8.76  HI  14.16  MS  16.18  ND  15.51  ND  12.48 
49  ND  8.91  ID  14.76  SC  16.63  AK  16.54  NM  14.76 
50  MT  9.61  WA  15.16  AK  19.13  WY  16.69  MS  15.94 
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Table 5.  List of Variables 
 









  $9.08 
 
 




TEL    .2158    .4114  www.limitedgovernment.org 
SMR    .1301    .3365  www.limitedgovernment.org 
Corrections 
spending per $1,000 
of State Personal 
Income 
  $2.41     1.20  Census Bureau and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Health and 
Hospitals spending 
per $1,000 of State 
Personal Income 
  $7.63     2.79  Census Bureau and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 












   
  .4776 
 





  .6249 
 
  .4843 
 
Book of the States 
Population 
Percentage 18-24 
  11.28    1.75  Census Bureau 
Population 
Percentage  5-17 
  22.15    3.56  Census Bureau 
Population 
Percentage >65 
  11.16    2.21  Census Bureau 
State Population  4,760,232   4,975,360  Statistical Abstract of the United States 
   38 
Table 6. Regression Results for Tax Revolt, Other State Spending, 
 and Political Variables 
 
 
  Independent Variable  1  2  3  4 
TEL  -.8759 
(7.84) 
     
Restrictive TEL    -.7986 
(5.78) 
   
Non-Restrictive TEL    -.9812 
(6.99) 
   
TEL Includes Tuition      -2.1066 
(13.14) 
 
TEL Excludes Tuition      -.3737 
(2.91) 
 
TEL Includes Tuition, 
Moving Base  
      -2.7932 
 (15.84) 
TEL Includes Tuition, 
Fixed Base  
      -1.3316 
 (5.79) 
TEL Excludes 
Tuition, Moving Base  
       .0906 
 (0.59) 
TEL Excludes 
Tuition, Fixed Base  








































































































2  .8801  .8802  .8857  .8895 
t statistics are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients   39 
 
Table 7. State Effects Averaged by Region 
 
Region  States  Average 
Coefficient 
F-Value 
New England  ME NH VT MA RI CT      -6.1302  282.96 
Middle Atlantic  NY NJ PA      -2.7918    34.39 
East North Central  OH IN IL MI WI      -1.1760    11.68 
West North Central  MN IA MO ND SD KS      -1.1203    12.11 
South Atlantic  DE MD VA WV NC SC GA FL      -1.3973    25.01 
East South Central  KY TN AL MS        0.0246      0.01 
West South Central  AR LA OK TX      -0.2171      0.54 
Mountain  MT ID WY CO NM AZ UT NV        0.2885      0.58 
Pacific  WA OR CA       0.2776      0.63 
    